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ABSTRACT
Previousmodels of rules versus discretion are extended to include
uncertainty about the policymaker's "type." When people observe low
inflation, they raise the possibility that the policymaker is committed to
low inflation (type 1). This enhancement of reputation gives the uncommitted
policymaker (type 2) an incentive to masquerade as the committed type. In
the equilibrium the policymaker of type 1 delIvers surprisingly low
inflation——with corresponding costs to the economy--over an extended
interval. The type 2 person mimics this outcome for awhile, but shifts
eventually to high Inflation. This high inflation is surprising initially,
but subsequently becomes anticipated.
Professor Robert J. Barro
Departrrent of Economics
University of Rochester
Rochester, NY 14627in previous research David Gordon and I (1983b) built on the work of
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and others to distinguish rules versus discretion
in monetary policy. When the policymaker could make binding commitments
(rules), it was feasible to achieve low average inflation. This result was
superior to that attainable with no commitments (discretion), where Inflation
tended to be high, but not surprisingly high. Because of the incentive to
create inflation surprises ex post (stemming from a desire to relieve some
existing distortions in the economy), only high inflation turned out to be
incentive—compatible for the policymaker who was not bound by a rule.
In some subsequent work (Barro and Gordon, 1983a), we considered
reputational forces that might substitute for formal rules. When future
inflationary expectations were tied to current actions, the discretionary
policymaker was motivated to keep inflation down. Thereby we found that an
equilibrium entailed lower inflation, which corresponded to a weighted
average of the outcome under a rule and that under discretion. However,
there were two shortcomings of this approach. First, the reputational
possibility hinged on an infinite horizon (otherwise the guaranteed cheating
in the last period leads to an unraveling of the solution). Second, the
equilibrium was not unique.1 From the positive standpoint of using the model
to predict the policymaker's behavior—-and thereby to predict monetary growth
and Inflation——this last feature is at least unfortunate.
Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Mllgrom and Roberts (1982) have dealt with
analogous problems in the area of industrial organization by introducing
1ThIs problemappears also in the related literature from game theory--see
Friedman (1971) and Green and Porter (1984).2
uncertainty about one of the player's objectives. In the present context
there could be uncertainty about either the policymakers preferences or
about his technology for making commitments. Then the extent of reputation
or credibility would correspond to an outside observer's subjective
probability that the policymaker Is of one type or another. In general,
current policy actions influence this probability and thereby affect the way
that people learn about the policymaker's true type. In addition, the
policvmaker takes this learning process into account when deciding how to
perform. Aside from giving content to notions of reputation and learning,
this approach has the advantage of not depending on an infinite horizon and
of sometimes delivering a unique perfect equilibrium. In the following I
apply this analysis to the setting of monetary policy.2
Setup of the Model
As in previous models (Barro and Gordon, 1983a, b), costs for period t
depend on actual and unexpected inflation,
(1) z =z(1r,
—
where Is actual Inflation for period t and is the representative
person's forecast of as of the beginning of period t.I assume
>0and -ic) < 0In the relevant range. Thus, costs rise
with the magnitude of inflation, j1rJ, but fall with surprise inflation,
The benefit from surprise Inflation can reflect some existing
2Prevlous discussions of this approach in the context of monetary policy
include Barro and Gordon (1983a, p. 119), Backus and DrIffill (1984, 1985),
TabellIni (1983), and Horn and Persson (1985, Section 6).3
distortions, such as taxation of market income or unemployment insurance,
that lead to Inefficiently low levels of employment and output. Through the
standard mechanism of the expectational Phillips Curve, surprise inflation
(reflecting surprise monetary expansion) raises output and Is thereby
beneficial. Alternatively, the use of surprise inflation as a capital levy
on nominally-denominated government obligations is desirable because it
lessens the need for distorting income taxes or other types of non—lump-sum
taxes (see Barro, 1983). For a given value of surprise inflation, —
theminimum of costs in equation (1) occurs at =0.(The model can
readily be modified so that the minimum obtains at an arbitrary value ir.)
Thepolicymaker strives to minimize the expected present value of costs,
T-t
E[z ÷ zti/(l +r) i-.. .•' zT/(l+r) ],
wherer >0is the exogenous and constant real discount rate and T is the
terminal period, which is discussed below. Since everybody agrees on the
merits of this objective, there Is no principal-agent problem In the model.
In the case where the policymaker makes a serious advance commitment to
inflation——so that =followsat once from general knowledge of this
commitment——the cost-minimizing value of the inflation rate Is =0for all
periods. The corresponding cost for each period is normalized to zero--that
is, z(0, 0) =0.
In a discretionary situation--where commitments are precluded—-the
policymaker takes current and future Inflationary expectations as givens.
Then the cost-minimizing Inflation rate for period t Is some value,which
generally depends on --that is,4
(2) =
Sincepeople understand the policymaker's behavior, It also follows here that
== #(,), sothat surprise Inflation, -
7c,is zero. For a given
form of' the cost function in equation (1) (with appropriate curvature
properties), the equilibrium determines some number, ,whichis such that
=(i).This result is the discretionary equilibrium as discussed in
previous research. The cost for each period in this equilibrium is
(3) z z =z(7r,0) > 0.
Hence, the outcome is higher costs than under the zero-inflation rule. This
result follows because the absence of commitments leads to Inflation that Is
high but not surprisingly high.
Suppose now that there are two types of policymakers.Type 1 is capable
of commitments and binds himself to the outcome =0for each period. Type
2 has no capacity to make commitments and simply strives at each date t to
minimize the expected present value of costs,E(zt + z1/(l +r)+... +
zT/(l ÷r)T_t),where costs for each period satisfy equation (i). Although
the policymaker knows his own type, the private agents cannot discern this
type directly. Instead they attempt to infer the true type from observed
3it Is basically equivalent if thepolicymakers differ by their relative
weights for the costs and benefits of inflation. But in the present
formulation each policymaker has the same tastes, which ,just reflect the
preferences of the "representative person." The suggestion of uncertainty
about whether one player has or has not made a commitment appears In Mllgrom
and Roberts (1982, p. 303) and has also been used by TabellIni (1983).0
performance,which means that they learn from experience. Thepoilcymaker of
type 2, who is not bound by commitments, understands this
learning process
and may be motivated to exploit it whenmaking choices of inflation rates.
Throughout I assume that the parameters of the cost functionin equation (1),
as well as the real interest rate r, are time-invariant andcommon knowledge.
The poiicymaker is installed at the beginning ofperiod 0 and remains in
power through period T.Thus, the game between the policymaker and the
private agents has a known, finIte horIzon.4 (The valueof T is common
knowledge.) In some circumstances the horizon can be identifiedwith the
term of office. However, that perspectivemay be too narrow, since various
mechanisms can motivate lame-duck officeholders to behave.The horizon can
also be Interpreted in terms of the persistence ofdifferences across
policymakers with respect to capacity for commitments (orpreferences about
Inflation).In other words, the distinction between type 1 andtype 2 may
not be permanent. Then a large value of T signifies thatthis designation by
type holds up for a long time. The form of the subsequent resultscontinues
to apply when the horizon becomes arbitrarilylong.
If people knew that the pol.icymaker was oftype 2, then the (perfect,
Nash) equilibrium would be the discretionary one,
1r
=i,asdescribed
before.5 Further, sincethe type-i person always picks =0,the
policymaker of type 2 can conceal his identity only bychoosing zero
inflation. The motivation for doing this is to holddown subsequent
4Thegame may also end probabilisticaily in each period. This possibility.
discussed In Barro and Gordon (1983a,p. 110), effectively adds to the
discount rate, r, in the objective function.
5This result holdswith a known, finite horizon. With an Infinite horizon
there are other "reputatlonal" equilibria,as considered in Barro and Gordon
(1983a).6
inflationary expectations, which helps to keep down future costs. However,
since the game ends in period T, there is no gain from masquerading as a
type-i person after this period. Therefore, the poilcymaker of type 2
definitely picks =In period T.
Suppose that there is an interval (r, T—l) for some r >0,during which
the policymaker of type 2 randomizes the choice of inflation between 0 and
=#(r).
(Recall that the value minimizes costs for period t when
expectations are glvenj The motIvation for randomizing can arise only if
the true type has not yet been revealed—-specifically, if 0 applied in
each prior period. Accordingly, let Pt be the probability that a type—2
policymaker sets =0,conditional on having chosen zero inflation in all
previous periods. Then the conditional probability of picking =isI —
Theperiod (r, T-l) Is the one where 0 <Pt
<1is supposed to apply.
In this interval the probability of selecting i= 0is neither zero nor one,
but is in the Interior of this range.
Let be the representative person's subjective probability as of the
start of period t that the policymaker is of type 1. The probability for
period 0, a, Is a given value and Is common knowledge. In the absence of
other information, would be the fraction of the population of potential
policymakers who are capable of commitments (and are therefore of type 1).
The two possible outcomes for inflation at date t are =0or = =
Theformer occurs If the policymaker is of type 1 (probability a) or
if the policymaker is of type 2 (probability I - butmasquerades as a
type 1 person (conditional probability Hence, the value emerges only
If the poilcymaker Is of type 2 (probability 1 -a)
and does not masquerade7
(conditional probability 1 -pr).For later use, letPt be the
representative person's perception of Then expected inflation for period
t is
- a)(l_p).
Equation (4) indicates the best forecast of period t's inflation rate,
Rtgivena and Notethat, since there are a large number of private
agents, no individual has the incentive to pretend that his expectations are
different from this value of In particular, each person takes as givens
the policymaker's behavior and everyone else's method forformulating
expectations. It follows that there is no reason for atomistic agents to
behave strategically——each one just aims for the best forecast ofinflation,
given how everyone else is acting.6 (Presumably, accurate forecasts of
inflation aid in other individual decisions, which areunnecessary to detail
for present purposes.)
6Backus and Driffill(1985) treat as a dichotomous variable, which in our
context would take on only the values 0 or In this case cannot be
interpreted as expected Inflation. rn another paper, Backus and Driffill
(1984) consider a two-sided game in which the private sector and the
policymaker each behave strategically. This setting Is Inappropriate if the
private sector consists of a large number of independent agents, as I assume
In the present paper. The assumption of a monolithic privatesector might be
applicable to a monopoly trade union that bargains for an economy-widewage
rate—-which is the setting imagined by Horn and Persson (1985, Section 6).
However, if the private sector acts collectively, then it Is unclear why
there Is an existing distortion (externality) that underlies the benefitfrom
unexpected inflation in equation (1).8
As people observe 'good behavior" from the policymaker——that is,
0--they revise upward the probability that the policymaker Is of type 1. The
adaptation formula follows from Bayes Law as
(5) a1 Prob. (type . .= 0)
Prob. (type =0).Prob.(7r= Oltype1)




Notethat if 0 <a < 1and 0Pt <1,then > Inother words, the
observation of =0raises the probability that the policymaker is of type
1.From the standpoint of a type—2 policymaker, this learning process means
that masquerading as a type—i person builds up one?s Image as someone who is
committed to low inflation.
The Incentives of Policymakers
Consider now the Incentives of a policymaker of type 2. Let V(a) be
the minimized expected present value of costs from date t onward, E(zt ÷
zt÷i/(l +r)+. .. + zT/(l+r)TtJ,conditional on having chosen zero
Inflation In all previous periods. In this case the policymaker has a
certain amount of current reputation, as summarized by the value of a. The
overall cost, V(a). equals the expected cost for period t, E(z), plus the
expected present value of costs from date t÷i onward. With probability Pt
the policymaker sets =0,whIch generates the amount of reputation a+19
shown in equation (5).In this case the minimized expected present value of
costs beginning at date ti-i isV1(a1). With probability the
policymaker sets = Thenthe reputation is lost (a÷a÷2 = =
0)and the costs each period are the discretionary ones z fromequation (3).
The present value (expressed in terms of period t units) of thisflow from
date ti-i through date T is (z/r)s[1 —i/(i+r)TtJ.Putting these results
together implies
1
(6) V(a) =E(zt)IPtVt+i(at÷1) +(1—P)(z/r){1
—17(1+r)Ttl,
for r<t < T-l and where satisfies equation (5). The value for
E(zt.)
Is given by
e e (7) E(zt) = —i) ÷(1—P)Z(1r,7r —
where =- a)(l— fromequation (4). Note that Z(;.' -i)
<
z(O, -ir), since minimizes period t's costs for given inflationary
expectations.
The policymaker of type 2 selectsPt at the start of period t in order to
mjmjmize the expected present value of costs. At thesame time——that is,
without seeing the value forPt or the realization of --the representative
person perceives that the probability of a type-2 pollcyinaker choosing zero
Inflation is However, there is nothing to constrain the policymaker at a
point in time to setPt = Thepolicymaker does not commit himself In
advance to pick zero Inflation with some designatedprobability--In fact,10
there is no commitment even to pursuing a mixed strategy. Further, the
private agents cannot verify ex post what probability the policymaker used.
If people could observe this probability (and hence verify it), then they
would know that the policymaker was of type 2. (The type 1 person does not
pursue a mixed strategy.)7 Therefore, the analysis will go through only if
the probability, is unobservable to the public, even ex post. The only
thing that people observe——at the start of the next period——is the value of
from the previous period. At a point in time the uncommitted policymaker
can choose any value of Pt that he wishes, which includes the pure strategies
of picking 0 or =withprobability 1. Thus, the outcome =
Pt
can emerge only if this choice for p. is at least as good for the policymaker
as any other value of given people's perceptions the value of a. and
the structure of the optimization problem as laid out in equations (6) and
(7).
Note that, for given V(a)isa linear function of Pt flequation
(6).8 Thus, ifV(a) were increasing then the policymaker would set
0 =1r),whereas if V(a) were decreasing in p, then he would set
Pt =1(= 0).In order for the policymaker to be willing to
randomize-—that is, to set Pt in the interior where 0 <Pt
<1——itmust be
that Vt(t) Is Independent of This Independence holds for a linear
function If and only if
7 am grateful to Michael Jones for this point.
8GIvenp, the term V1(a1) is independent of Note that In
equation (5) depends on p, rather than because Pt Is unobservable even
at the start of period t + 1.11
àV(cx)
(8) 0 = - z(0,- — z(rt, ÷ V1(a1)/(1 +r)
T-t —(z/r)[i—1/(1+r) J.
Equation(8) applIes in the interval, (r, T-l), where randomization occurs
<< 1).
The result in equation (8) Implies that the minimized expected present





for r <t<T-1.Using this result to substitute out for Vt and V÷1 in
equation (6) leads to the basic condition that supports randomization of
policy,9
1 1 — —
(10)z(r.
÷(l÷r)
Z= z(0,—7) +(1)z(ti. t÷i —
forr <t<T—l.The left side of equatIon (10) is the present value of
costs over period t and t+l If the policymaker reveals himself today by
setting == #(7t). Thenthe cost next period is the discretionary one
z. The right side of equation (10) is the present value of costs for the two
periods if the policymaker masquerades today (c =0)but reveals himself
tomorrow= '÷= (Ineither case the costs are z from date
9The result for period T—1uses the condition =0,which implies VT(aT) =
E(zT)ZO,"T
-12
t÷2 onwards, so these terms do not appear in equation (10).) In order to be
willing to randomize over having made a commitment to do so——the
policymaker must be indifferent between cheating" today or cheating
tomorrow. Hence, the equality of costs In equation (10).






forr < t < T-1. The left side of equation (11) is the "temptation to cheat"
today (refer to Barro and Gordon, 1983a, p. 107) by setting =rather
than =0.(The difference in costs is positive since the value
minimizes todayTs cost.) The right side is the "enforcement power," which
motivates the policymaker to maintain a low-inflation reputation today by
choosing =0.The gain from deferring high Inflation is the difference
between the discretionary cost z (which arises in period t÷1 f' =1t.)and
the lower cost from setting =÷l
=#(1l)(which can arise only if'
=0).
Properties of the Equilibrium
Equation (11) prescribes a time path for expected Inflation that must
hold in order for the poilcymaker of type 2 to be willing to randomize at
each date t. Thus far, I have explored In detail the Implications of this
condition only for the case of the simple cost function that I used
previously (Barro and Gordon, 1983a). Namely the cost function from equation
(1) Is now specialized to13
a e 2 e
(12) z z(it,
— - b(ir—
wherea, b >0and common knowledge. As I discuss later, Itappears that the
main results are not very sensitive to modifications of thiscost function.
Using the specification of costs from equation (12), the inflationrate
that minimizes costs for given expectations is
(1flr = "'a '-—,t
which is independent of .(Thisresult follows becausez in equation (12)
is linear in it.)Theterms that appear in equation (11) are given by














for r÷ I<t<'F,where recall that b/a =icinthis model. For the cost
function given in equation (12), randomization requires thatexpected
Inflation be constant.14
Equation (4) implIes that expected inflation must also satisfy
(15) i(b/a)(l.at)(l_p).
Here I have substituted the actual probability Pt for the perceived
probability That is, since the policymaker of type 2 is guaranteed to be
Indifferent over the choice of probabilities, I look at the behavior that is
consistent with people's perceptions. The question of why an agent would be
motivated to pursue just the right mixed strategy seems to arise whenever
behavior Is not committed and the equilibrium entails randomization.
However, the resulting equilibrium will satisfy the condition that the
policymaker not prefer any other course of action.
Equations (14) and (15) dictate a relationship over time between the
probability that the policymaker Is of type I and the probabilityPt that
the type-2 person masquerades as a type 1, namely
(1—r)
(16) (la)(l_p) 2
for r +I<t<T.It is apparent from equation (16) that a rising path of
reputation (from the updating formula In equation (5)) must be accompanied
by a declining path of As the type-2 person builds reputation via good
past performance (a rises as long as zero inflation is observed), It must be
that the probability of continued good performance by a type—2 person,
Pt,
diminishes. Note also that the left side of equation (18) is positive, which
requires r <1on the right side. If r >1,the discount rate Is so high'5
that the threat of lost reputation Is Insufficient ever to motivate the
type—2 person to select zero inflation. Hence, == b/a =0)emerges
from the start if r >1.Some further discussion of this result appears
below.
The determination of the equilibrium path of a and Pt follows by
combining equation (16) with Bayes' rule for updating a. The latter
condition, stated In equation (5), is
(17) a =
t÷1
for r <t<T-l.With the addition of the boundary condition, =0,
equations (16) and (17) determine the path of a and Pt for t =r-l,
T,10 up to the determination of the starting date for randomization r.
The computations involve a first-order linear difference equation in











0ThIs calculation does not yet use equation (17) at t =r.16
for r ÷ 1 <t<T.Note that rises over time (since (1÷r)/2 <1),while
Pt falls. As t -øT,Pt approaches 0, whIle tends toward the value
(1÷r)/2.
The starting date for randomization, r, depends mainly on the length of
the horizon, T, and the initial probability of being type 1.Consider the
value of t--not necessarily an Integer——that would equate the result for




The solution for r Is the largest Integer contained in t*__denoted







(22) r =i.[T +1—
log(a0)/log['—i-—
subjectto the inequalities In (21).hl
Finally, the probability p of masquerading In period r Is determined so
that the updating formula in equation (17) holds at date t =r,given that
11Thls result corresponds to that In Backus andDriffIll (1985, p. 536).
Their other findings differ somewhat from mine because they view the private
sector as randomizing its choice of expected inflation (see n. 6 above).17
satisfiesequation (18) and a1 =a0.The resulting probabilityr is
somewhat above that indicated in equation (19) (plugging in t =r),unless
the value t in equation (20) happens to be exactly an Integer.
Assuming that r >0,the policyinaker of type 2 sets =0with
probability 1 at dates prior to r (beginning with the starting date 0).In
this situation the horizon is long enough so that the pollcymakerprefers
Pt1. to randomization. SincePt =1during this interval, expected
inflation is zero. Therefore, the costs are those associated with a full
commitment to zero inflation, namely z(0, 0) =0.Since Pt =1,It also
follows (from equation (17)) that there is no updating of beliefs about the
policyinaker during this period. That is,a =a0for 0 <t<7.
Ifthe prior probabilitya0 is very low and/or the horizon T is
T
Ii
relativelyshort, then a0 <[Jwould hold. In this case there is no
interval during whichPt =1obtains. The starting point for randomization
is then r =0,but the formulas fora and Pt in equations (18) and (19)
continue to apply for 0 <t<T.
In this situation the initial probability of masqueradingp0 must be such




[—-—Jfrom equation (18)--contingent on =0being realized. The
smaller the value ofa0, the lower p0 must be in order for the correct value
of a1 tobegenerated from the updating formula in equation (17). The
solution for this initial probability is18




In one sense the solutions for (ar. in equations (18) and (19) apply
no matter how small the Initial probability a0 that the policymaker is of
type 1. However, as a0 -0,p0 -.0in equation (23). Therefore, it becomes
Increasingly likely that == b/a,which means that the discretionary
outcome would obtain in all succeeding periods. Further, as an -,0and po
0 ,Italso follows that =
ir(1-a0)(1—p0)tends to i =b/a.Accordingly,
for very small values of a0, it becomes likely that a close approximation to
the discretionary result will emerge from the outset.
A small value of a0 does have to be weighed against the length of the
T
1 +r]
horizon T, since the relevant condition is a0 < —--j .Forany finite a0,
an infinite horizon T rules out this inequality. Therefore, with an infinite
horizon, the condition a0 > 0 implies that there will be a starting interval
(of infinite length) during which Pt1 applies.
As the horizon T approaches infinity, the situation approaches that of a
fully committed rule where = = 0obtains for all t.In this case the
present value of costs approaches zero. The policymaker of type 2 retains
the option of cheating today (or in any period) by setting =, thereby
— — I
attaining the lower one-period cost, z(, x) =- b2/a.But the revelation
of his identity implies that the subsequent outcomes are the discretionary
ones, == ;,with z == p2/a. Withan infinite horizon, the net
effect of cheating In the current period on the present value of costs is
therefore19






The previously mentioned condition r <1ensures that cheating delivers a
higher present value of costs than that from setting =0for all finite t.
In other words, if T -,and r <1,the potential loss of reputation is
sufficient to enforce the low-Inflation outcome for a type-2 policymaker.2
The final possibility is a very high starting probability of being type
i——specifically, a >(1÷r)/2in expression (21). In this case (if r <1),
the policymaker sets Pt =1for the entire interval, 0 <t<T-1,before
switching to T =0in the last period. Thus, there is no period of
randomization——or of accumulation of reputation in the sense of a rising
value of ar__when the policymaker starts with a level of reputation that
exceeds the critical level, (1÷r)/2.
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium path for the probabilities and Pt.
T
1+rl
These values apply for a policymaker of type 2, assuming that <a
<
Priorto date r, the figure shows Pt =1and = Duringthis
12
period == 0.Then at date r there is a discrete decline i' but
has not yet changed. From date r ÷1 onward the probability of
masquerading as a type-i person follows the declining path shown in equation
(19), while the probability of being type 1 follows the rising path given
by equation (18). Along this path expected inflation is the constant
result did not obtain in Barro and Gordon (1983a) because the loss of
reputation lasted for only one period in that model. Since cheating reveals
one's identity in the present case, the punishment interval is effectively
infinite when the horizon is infinite.19a
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Behaviorof Probabilities a andp
Note: Before date ;p" 1 and —
a0.
From date t+iuntil date T,
Pt satisfy equations (18) and (19). respectively. Fordate t,
whileP is somewhat above the value implied by equation (19).20
1
(l—r)b/a. Finally, at date T, the value of T is zero, while a equals
1
(l÷r)/2. (Note that =(liiT)b/a
=(l—r)b/a,which is the same value as
in the interval between r-l and T—l.)13
The length of the interval, T -r,where randomization occurs follows
from equation (22) as
I Il+rll
(24) T —r=mt[lo(cx)/lo[__Jj —1
Since 0 < < 1 and 0 < r < 1, this interval falls (or does not change) with.
a higher prior probability of being type 1. Accordingly, a higher value
of implies a longer interval, (0, r—l), during which the zero—inflation
outcome occurs with probability 1.It also follows from equation (24) that a
higher value of the discount rate r raises (or leaves unchanged) the
randomization interval, T—r. In effect, a higher value of r lessens the
I3rt is possible to rule outother equilibria in this model by showing that
they are Inconsistent with rational expectations, given the incentives of a
type—2 policymaker. For example, if > 0 and r < 1, then Pt > 0 must hold
for all t < T. Hence there Is no interval--analogous to that
before_date
r—-where the high-inflation outcome r occurs deterministically. IfPt =0
were conjectured, then the choice it=0Implies '= 1and ,e =0.Then t ti-i ti-i
the choice =itdelivers a low cost for period ti-I (with the
discretionary outcomes arising thereafter). This behavior turns out to
generate a lower present value of costs (if r < 1) than those from setting
=it,which means going along at date t with the perceptionPt =0.The
result demonstrates thatPt =0leads to Pt 1.It follows that is
irrational for all t ( T if > 0 and r < 1.Similarly, it is possible to
rule out Pt < 1 for t < r or =1for t > r.21
value of reputation and thereby decreases the length of the period, (0, r—l),
during which low inflation arises for sure. Table 1 shows the length of the
interval, T—r, (in numbers of "periods") from equation (24) for various
values of the parameters a0 and r.(The numbers apply subject to the
condition that each be less than or equal to the value T—1.)
Note that a change in a0 alters the length of the randomization interval,
T-r, but does not change the path of (ar, during this interval. The main
consequence of a higher value of a is the increase in the length of the
period, (0, r—1), during which actual and expected inflation equal zero.14
Correspondingly, there is a decrease in the length of the period, (r ÷1,T),
for which expected inflation Is the higher amount e =(1-r)b/a.These
effects mean that the cost realized by either a type-i or type—2 policymaker
are lower the higher the value of a0. Therefore, the greater the fraction of
committed persons in the population of potential policymakers the better the
outcomes for either type of policyniaker.
This finding does not mean that the results improve If the policymaker
turns out, ex post, to be of type 1.Before date r the outcomes are
identical (at == 0)for either type. From date r onward the results
continue to be the same for each as long as the policymaker of type 2
masquerades by choosing zero Inflation. But at some point the type-2 person
"cheats" by setting == b/a,which exceeds the expectation =
1
(l-r)b/a. Thereafter the outcomes for this poilcymaker are the
4For a given r, an increase ina0 also raises the value of p. for the
Initial period of randomization. Hence declines when a rises.Table 1





0 3 2 1 0 0
.05 3 2 1 0 0
.10 4 2 1 0 0
.25 5 3 1 0 0
.50 9 7 3 1 0
.75 21 16 9
f fl÷r
Note: The table shows the value T—r = -1,where mt.
indicates the largest integer contained in the bracketed term. The numbers
T
fl÷rl
apply subject to the condition > fromexpression (21), which




discretionary ones, where = = ir.Tosee the implications for overall
costs, recall that a policymaker of type 2 employs a mixed strategy only
because the present value of costs is invariant to the time of cheating,
except that cheating surely occurs by date T. Therefore, pretend that
cheating (7tt
=iforthe first time) occurs exactly at date T.In this case
the outcomes for type 1 and type 2 coincide through date T-l. Then at date
T. where inflationary expectations are =(1-r)b/a,the type—i person sets
=fl rMhi1g frr == hI Thrh, th tun—2 nprQg-n r11rpQ
T T
lower costs at date T.(The value ir minimizes costs for given expectations,
which is the case here.) It follows that the overall present value of costs
is lower if the policymaker turns out to be of type 2.Because of the
benefit from the one period of surprisingly high inflation, the outcomes are
better if the randomly selected policymaker happens to be the kind that is
incapable of commitments.
Ex ante, the expected costs weigh the type-i realization by the
probability a and the type-2 by It turns out that these expected
costs are lower the higher the value of a0.5 Outcomes are better on average
if the policymakers come from a pool that contains a higher fraction of those
who are capable of commitments. This result is consistent with the previous
conclusion that costs are smaller if the realization for the choice of
policymaker is type 2.
can be shown by direct calculation of the present value of costs for
the two types, pretending now that the type—2 person cheats In period r (that
is, sets =r23
I have assumed that the policymaker of type 1 always sets inflation at
the committed value 0. Zero inflation is optimal with the assumedcost
function if commitments are not only made but are also fully believed. In
the present context credibility is tempered by the possibility that the
policymaker Is type 2.In this case the best value to commit to need no
longer be zero inflation. It would be possible to determine thesequence of
committed values, =ir.,which minimizes the overall expected present value
of costs (weighing type-i outcomes by a and type-2 by l—aj. Conceivably
these values would then be the ones announced each period by bothtypes of
policymakers, where type 1 makes a serious commitment and type 2 only
masquerades with some probability. However, I have not yet made much
progress in figuring out the properties of the resulting path of
Alternative Cost Functions
A surprising aspect of the result is that expected inflation remains
e efl-r b constant during the period after date r. That is, = = — aslong
as people observe zero Inflation. The cholceof zero inflation does enhance
credibility in the sense that the probability of being type 1 rises over
time. But the failing probabilityPt of good behavior by a type-2
policymaker offsets this effect and keeps expected inflation constant. Thus,
the results are discouraging from the perspective of relying on reputation to
lower inflationary expectations.
In order to see whether these results depend on the simplified cost
function in equation (12). I modified the function to include a quadratic




The last term, with c > 0, could represent the distortion from incorrect
information about the general price level. Now unexpected inflation conveys
benefits on net (by relieving other distortions) only if the surprise is not
too large—-specifically, if - <2b/c.
The new cost function in equation (25) does imply that the discretionary
Inflation rate, rises with expected inflation——specifically,
(26) =(b+ cx)/(a ÷ c).
The condition for randomization of policy in equation (11) becomes a
first—order difference equation in expected inflation. The equation is
quadratic in and ir. There is one value for expected inflation, call it
such that expected Inflation would be constant over time.16 That is,
=eimplies e =xe Taking a linear expansion of the quadratic
terms around the stationary value e It is possible to solve the difference
equation explicitly. The result Is that follows damped oscillations
16The second root of the quadratic equation turns out to be Inadmissible
because It Is Inconsistent with > 0 and Pt0. The admissible root is
=.(l+2[a(l—r)+c]/[a+c(1÷ r)])1"2 —25
around the rest point 7re.17 Further, the departure of inflationary
expectations from e for the initial period of randomization r--and hence for
all subsequent dates t--derives from the discrete length ofperiods and the
associated integer restriction on r. Otherwise,= ewould apply at each
date.
The main Conclusion is that the modification of the cost function
produces no tendency for to fall during the period of randomization. The
condition that ir is constant no longer holds precisely, but isa reasonable
approximation to the solution. My conjecture is that this result would hold
even with more complicated specifications of costs.rt seems that expected
inflation would approximate the (single?) value that corresponds to therest
point, =1,in equation (11).
Predictions for Inflation and other Variables
Return now to the simplified model where costs are given by equation
(12). When viewed as a positive theory, the model has predictions for the
behavior of Inflation (and underlying monetary growth), which dependon
whether the policymaker turns out to be of type 1 or type 2. With
probability a0 the policymaker is of type 1 and thereby makes a serious
commitment to zero (or more generally low) inflation. Theremay be an
interval of length r over which expected inflation is alsozero.(This
17The solution is - =(i-e)(_)t-rwhere Y =2(1+r)and r is the
first period for randomization. The oscillations of around are damped
as long as .(1 + r) < 1.26
T
l+r
applies if r <1and a0 >—i— .) But(if r <1and a0 <(l÷r)/2)there is
asubsequent Interval of length T-r where expectations are higher-—namelye
1
=(i-r)b/a-—but
the policymaker continues to choose zero inflation.
Correspondingly, the economy suffers from a string of surprisingly low
inflation, which might show up as a recession or as an increase in distorting
taxes. Thus, the committed policymaker continually "bites the bullet" in the
sense of tolerating the losses from surprisingly low inflation in order to
maintain the low—inflation reputation. Nevertheless, this process does not
succeed in reducing inflationary expectations. Credibility does rise over
time in the form of a growing belief a that the policymaker is of type 1.
But the offsetting reduction over time in the probability Pt that a type—2
person would select low inflation keeps expected Inflation constant.
If the policymaker turns out to be of type 2 (whIch occurs with
T
1+r
probability l-i0), then (if r <1and a0 >
—i---) thereis again a period of
length r where == 0obtains. Subsequently, as long as =0is
chosen, the path mimics that of the type—i person. But, with the rising
probability i-pt, the policymaker opts for high Inflation, ,whichgenerates
some short—run benefits from a positive inflation shock (which reflects an
underlying shock to money). From then on the outcomes are the discretionary
ones where actual and expected inflation are both high (c = =
Onecharacteristic of the equilibrium Is a string of inflation rates that
are below expectations. In the period after date r, where expectations are
=(l-r)b/a,the type-i person surely picks =0<ewhile the type—2
person has this realization with conditional probability The observation27
of a sequence of forecast errors ofone sign may make it appear that
expectations are irrational. In fact, theseoutcomes must be weighed against
the
Probabllity__(lt)(1_pt)__that the policymaker is of type 2 and will
engineer a large positive surprise for inflation.Taking this element Into
account, the expectations are rational in theequilibrium solution.
According to the model, a long history of data---wjthoccasional changes
In the identity of the policymaker(or of the policy "regime')--wouj
display a large number of relatively smallnegative inflation shocks that are
offset by a small number of largepositive surprises. On average, unexpected
inflation is zero, but there are substantialruns of negative realizations.
The result resembles the "pesoproblem' for a "fixed" exchange rate.In
these cases the occasional discretedevaluations of a currency offset the
strings of errors when the expected devaluationexceeds the realized
devaluation of zero (which applies when theexchange rate remains fixed).18
For a discussion of the devaluation modelunder rational expectations see
Blarico and Garber, 1985.
concluding Observations
The introduction of uncertainty about thepolicymaker's type allows for
meaningful notions of reputation and learning.Thereby the approach avoids
some difficulties with multiple equilibria.Also, it is no longer necessary
that policymakers plan over an infinitehorizon.
The results are Interesting sincethey show how surprisingly low or high
inflation can emerge as part of theequilibrium. The extended Interval where
18ThIs caseapplies when the exchange rate either remains fixedor is
devalued by a discrete amount. Appreciationsof the currency are not
considered in this model.28
inflation is below expectations seems to correspond to notions of the
policymakers "bitting the bullet." That is, the costs from surprisingly low
inflation are accepted in order to enhance ones reputation for low
inflation. (But the failure of expected inflation to fall here is a puzzling
finding. )Theuncommitted policyinaker manages to create surprisingly high
inflation for a period. This result corresponds to the idea that a surge in
inflation can provide benefits in the "short run." But, as is also usually
supposed, the long—term cost is that people raise their expectations of
inflation. Thus-—as in the case of the discretionary policymaker in previous
models——the uncommitted poliicymaker ends up with an interval where inflation
is high, but not surprisingly high.
One shortcoming of the approach is that it relies on differences in types
of policymakers. In the present context these differences relate to
capacities for making commitments. But divergences in preferences for
"inflation versus unemployment" would generate similar results.It would
seem preferable to generate predictions for inflation that depended less on
individual traits of policymakers and more on basic institutional features.
But if all potential policymakers were the same, there would be nothing to
learn from seeing their actions. Then the model reduces to ones studied
previously, which had the shortcomings mentioned before.References
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